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Abstract. More than two decades after the first stack smashing at-
tacks, memory corruption vulnerabilities utilizing stack anomalies are
still prevalent and play an important role in practice. Among such vul-
nerabilities, uninitialized variables play an exceptional role due to their
unpleasant property of unpredictability: as compilers are tailored to oper-
ate fast, costly interprocedural analysis procedures are not used in prac-
tice to detect such vulnerabilities. As a result, complex relationships that
expose uninitialized memory reads remain undiscovered in binary code.
Recent vulnerability reports show the versatility on how uninitialized
memory reads are utilized in practice, especially for memory disclosure
and code execution. Research in recent years proposed detection and pre-
vention techniques tailored to source code. To date, however, there has
not been much attention for these types of software bugs within binary
executables.
In this paper, we present a static analysis framework to find uninitial-
ized variables in binary executables. We developed methods to lift the
binaries into a knowledge representation which builds the base for specif-
ically crafted algorithms to detect uninitialized reads. Our prototype
implementation is capable of detecting uninitialized memory errors in
complex binaries such as web browsers and OS kernels, and we detected
7 novel bugs.
1 Introduction
Memory corruption vulnerabilities are prevalent in programs developed in type-
unsafe languages such as C and C++. These types of software faults are known
since many years and discovering memory corruption bugs in binary executa-
bles has received a lot of attention for decades. Nevertheless, it is still an open
research problem to efficiently detect vulnerabilities in binary code in an au-
tomated and scalable fashion. Especially temporal bugs seem to be a common
problem in complex programs, an observation that the steady stream of reported
vulnerabilities confirms [12–14,43]. In practice, especially web browsers are often
affected by temporal bugs and these programs suffer from use-after-free vulner-
abilities, race conditions, uninitialized memory corruptions, and similar kinds of
software vulnerabilities.
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2 Garmany et al.
One specific challenge is the efficient detection of uninitialized memory er-
rors, such as uninitialized stack variables. While such vulnerabilities got into
the focus of several real-world attacks [4, 9–11, 14, 21], they still represent an
attack vector that is not studied well and often overlooked in practice. The basic
principle of such vulnerabilities is straightforward: if a variable is declared but
not defined (i.e., not initialized properly) and used later on in a given program,
then an attacker may abuse such a software fault as an attack primitive. The
uninitialized variable may for example contain left-over information from prior
variables in stale stack frames used during prior function calls. This information
can be used to disclose memory and leak sensitive information, which can then
be used by an attacker to bypass Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
or other defenses. In the worst case, an attacker can control the content of an
uninitialized variable and use it to execute arbitrary code of her choice, hence
fully compromising the program. Uninitialized memory errors represent a vul-
nerability class that often affects complex, real-world programs: for example, at
the 2016 edition of the annual pwn2own contest, Microsoft’s Edge web browser
fell victim to an uninitialized stack variable [4]. As a result, this vulnerability
was enough to exploit the memory corruption vulnerability and gain full control
over the whole program. Similarly, an uninitialized structure on the stack was
used in the pwn2own contest 2017 to perform a guest-to-host privilege escalation
in VMware [21].
The detection of uninitialized variables in an automated way has been studied
for software whose source code is available [17,22,24]. The urge for such systems,
especially targeting the stack, is also addressed by recent research through tools
like SafeInit [30] or UniSan [27]. These systems set their main focus on pre-
vention and also rely on source code.
In practice, however, a lot of popular software is unfortunately proprietary
and only available in binary format. Hence, if source code is unavailable, we need
to resort to binary analysis. The analysis of binary code, on the other hand, is
much more challenging since some of the context information gets lost during
the compilation phase. The loss of data and context information (e.g, names,
types, and structures of data are no longer available) hampers analysis and their
reconstruction is difficult [20, 23, 39]. Thus, the development of precise analysis
methods is more complicated without this information. Addressing this issue,
we are compelled to consider every statement in the assembly code as it might
relate to uninitialized memory of stack variables.
In this paper, we address this challenge and propose an automated analysis
system to statically detect uninitialized stack variables in binary code. Since
dynamic analysis methods typically lack comprehensive coverage of all possible
paths, we introduce a novel static analysis approach which provides full cover-
age, at the cost of potentially unsound results (i.e., potential false positive and
false negatives). However, unveiling potential spots of uninitialized reads and
covering the whole binary poses a more attractive trade-off given the high value
of detecting novel vulnerabilities. Note that the information obtained by our
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approach can further serve in a dynamic approach, e.g., to automatically verify
each warning generated by our method.
Our analysis is performed in two phases: First, we designed a framework to lift
binary software into an intermediate representation, which is further transformed
into a knowledge base that serves our Datalog programs. We opted for Datalog
given that this declarative logic programming language enables us to efficiently
query our deductive database that contains facts about the binary code. Based
on Datalog, we then devised an accurate points-to analysis which is both flow-
and field-sensitive. More specifically, with points-to information we have explicit
information on indirect writes and reads that are connected to passed pointers.
This allows us to track the indirect read or write back to the specific calling
context where the points-to information is further propagated and incorporated
in our knowledge base. This analysis step builds up the conceptual structure on
which our dataflow algorithms to detect uninitialized variables operate.
To demonstrate the practical feasibility of the proposed method, we imple-
mented a prototype which is tailored to detect uninitialized stack variables. Our
results show that we can successfully find all uninitialized stack vulnerabilities
in the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) binaries. In addition, we detected sev-
eral real-world vulnerabilities in complex software such as web browsers and OS
kernel binaries. Finally, our prototype is able to detect and pinpoint new and
previously unknown bugs in programs such as objdump, and gprof.
In summary, our main contributions in this paper are:
– We design and implement an automated static analysis approach and intro-
duce several processing steps which enable us to encode the complex data
flow within a given binary executable to unveil unsafe zones in the control
flow graph (i.e., basic blocks in which potential uninitialized reads might
occur).
– We present a flow-, context- and field-sensitive analysis approach built on
top of these processing steps, suitable for large-scale analysis of binary exe-
cutables to detect uninitialized reads in a given binary executable.
– We evaluate and demonstrate that our analysis framework can detect both
vulnerabilities in synthetic binary executables and complex, real-world pro-
grams. Our results show that the framework is capable of finding new bugs.
2 Uninitialized Stack Variables
Stack variables are local variables stored in the stack frame of a given function.
A function usually allocates a new stack frame during its prologue by decreasing
the stack pointer and setting up a new frame pointer that points to the beginning
of the frame. Depending on the calling convention, either the caller or callee take
care of freeing the stack frame by increasing the stack pointer and restoring the
old frame pointer. For example, in the stdcall calling convention, the callee
is responsible for cleaning up the stack during the epilogue. It is important to
note that data from deallocated stack frames are not automatically overwritten
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during a function’s prologue or epilogue. This, in particular, means that old
(and thus stale) data can still be present in a newly allocated stack frame.
A stack variable that is not initialized properly hence contains old data from
earlier, deallocated stack frames. Such a variable is also called uninitialized. An
uninitialized stack variable can lead to undefined behavior, not at least due to
its unpleasant property that the program does not necessarily crash upon such
inputs. In practice, uninitialized variables can be exploited in various ways and
pose a serious problem [4, 9–11, 14, 28]. They usually contain junk data, but if
an attacker can control these memory cells with data of her choice, the software
vulnerability might enable arbitrary code execution.
To tackle this problem, the compiler can report uninitialized stack variables
at compile time for intraprocedural cases. Unfortunately, interprocedural cases
are usually not taken into account by compilers. This lies in the nature of com-
pilers which need to be fast and cannot afford costly analysis procedures. Even
for optimization purposes, past research reveals that the benefits of extensive
interprocedural analyses are not large enough to be taken account of in compil-
ers [35].
3 Design
In the following, we provide a comprehensive overview of our static analysis
framework to detect uninitialized stack variables in binary executables. Our anal-
ysis is divided into two processing stages. In a pre-processing step, we lift the
binary into an IL and transform each function into SSA with respect to registers.
The transformed functions are translated into Datalog facts which serve as our
extensional database or knowledge base.
Based on this database, we then perform an interprocedural points-to analysis
with respect to stack pointers. The analysis also results in information about
pointers that are passed as arguments to functions and hence we can determine
those pointers that enter a new function context. The reconstructed information
about indirect definitions and uses of stack locations is used in a post-processing
state in which we determine safe zones for each stack access. Safe zones consist
of safe basic blocks, i.e., a use in these blocks with respect to the specific variable
is covered by a definition on all paths. Stack accesses outside their corresponding
safe zone produce warnings. For each variable, we determine a safe zone in its
corresponding function context.
Our dataflow algorithms propagate information about safe zones from callers
to callees and vice versa. If a path exists from the entry of a function to the use
of a variable, which avoids the basic blocks of its safe zone, then the stack
access is flagged unsafe. If a potentially uninitialized parameter is passed to
a function, we check if the exit node of the function belongs to its safe zone.
This in particular means that each path from the entry point of the function
to the leaf node is covered by a definition (i.e., initialization) of the variable.
We propagate this information back to the call sites, i.e., the fallthrough basic
block at the call site is added to the safe zone of the variable in the context of
Static Detection of Uninitialized Stack Variables in Binary Code 5
Fig. 1: Architecture implemented by our prototype.
the caller. This information in turn is further propagated and used at other call
sites. Figure 1 shows the architecture implemented by our prototype. Our design
allows to attach different checker plugins into the system that work and enrich
the same knowledge base with valuable information. Each plugin can be run in
parallel. Whenever a new information enters the knowledge base, the plugins
adapt to it.
Warnings and safe zones are outputs of the analysis phase and put into the
knowledge base. A monitor observes changes made to safe zones and warnings
to either spawn the Datalog algorithms or a symbolic execution engine. The
symbolic execution engine tackles the path sensitivity and is fed with safe zones
of each stack variable. The aim of the symbolic execution engine is to reach the
warning, i.e., a potential uninitialized read, by avoiding the safe zone of that
variable. The whole procedures cycle, i.e., each component contributes to the
knowledge base which in turn is consumed by other components to adapt.
Our current prototype is tailored towards uninitialized stack variables. How-
ever, as the plugin system suggests, we are able to enrich the analyses with heap
information (see § 5.3). In the next sections, we explain the individual analysis
steps in detail and present examples to illustrate each step.
3.1 Stack Pointer Delta
On Intel x86 and many other instruction set architectures, the stack pointer is
used to keep a reference to the top of the stack. The stack is usually accessed
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Fig. 2: Stack Pointer Delta (spd) addressing.
in relation to the current stack pointer. On Intel x86, the frame pointer is ad-
ditionally linked to the stack pointer and keeps a reference to the beginning of
the current stack frame. A function stack frame can, therefore, be located on
different stack addresses depending on its stack pointer value. Because of this,
we can not refer to a stack address directly. Instead, we use a delta value de-
pending on the stack pointer. We refer to this addressing type as stack pointer
delta addressing. A stack frame always starts at delta zero and grows towards
negative values. Therefore, local variables are located at negative offsets, while
passed arguments through the stack reside at positive offsets. We handle the
fastcall calling convention for both x64 and x86 architectures in a generic way
by means of Datalog rules . To simplify the analysis, we rebase all memory ac-
cesses on the stack to be relative to the stack pointer instead of using the frame
pointer.
Definition 1. Let S be the set of all stack variables. Each s ∈ S is a tuple of the
form (spds, f lds) where spds is the stack pointer delta of s and fld an optional
field value added to the base address of the underlying memory object.
Figure 2 illustrates this concept. Function f1 calls f2. The resulting stack is
shown on the right-hand side. In each stack frame the saved EIP value is mapped
to the delta value zero. A direct access to var1 inside function f1 is associated
with (−8, 0), since it is at delta −8. Variable varX is also at delta value −8
but inside function f2. Each delta value is associated with the corresponding
function in which the access occurs.
3.2 Points-To Analysis for Binaries
Analyzing binary machine code poses many challenges to overcome. The lack
of type information forces us to analyze each IL statement. To overcome the com-
plicated arrangement of work list algorithms, we decided to opt for a declarative
approach. Rather than solving the problem by an imperative algorithm, we de-
scribe the problem and let the solver perform the evaluation strategy. Therefore,
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Input: EDB
Output: Points-To Facts
1 VPtsTo(V1, SPD, Addr, Ctx) ←
StackPointer(V1, Addr, SPD).
2 VPtsTo(V1, SPD, Addr, Ctx) ←
Assign(V1,V2, Addr),
VptsTo(V2, SPD, , Ctx).
3 VPtsTo(V1, SPD2, Addr, Ctx) ←
Load(V1, V2, Disp, Addr, Ctx),
VPtsTo(V2, SPD, Addr2, Ctx),
CanReach(Addr, Addr2, Ctx),
PointerPtsTo(SPD, Disp, SPD2).
4 PointerPtsTo(SPD,Disp,SPD, Ctx) ←
Store(V1, Disp, V2, Addr, Ctx),
VPtsTo(V1, SPD, , Ctx),
VptsTo(V2, SPD, , Ctx).
5 VPtsTo(Res, SPD+Value, Addr, Ctx) ←
BinOp(Op, Res, V1, V2, Addr, Ctx),
VPtsTo(V1, SPD, , Ctx),
Constant(V2, Value, Addr).
6 VPtsTo(V2, SPD2, CalleeAddr, Callee)←
Param(V1, Arg, Addr, Caller,
V2, CalleeAddr, Callee),
TranslateSPD(Arg, Callee, SPD2),
VptsTo(V1, , , Caller).
7 VPtsTo(V1, SPD, Addr, Ctx) ←
Phi(V1, PhiReg, Addr, Ctx),
VptsTo(V1, SPD, , Ctx).
8 IndirectDef(V1, SPD, Addr) ←
Store(V1, Disp, V2, Addr, Ctx),
VptsTo(V1, SPD, , Ctx).
9 IndirectUse(V1, SPD, Addr) ←
Load(V1, V2, Disp, Addr, Ctx),
VptsTo(V1, SPD, , Ctx).
Variables:
Addr Instruction address
Vi Register or memory expression
SPD Stack pointer delta value (spd)
of the corresponding stack lo-
cation
Ctx Function name/context
Arg Part of Param facts; describes
which parameter we are deal-
ing with (1st, 2nd, . . .)
EDB Facts:
StackPointer A fact that unifies V1 with the
register that holds a pointer.
The Addr of the instruction
and the spd value of the stack
location are stored in the cor-
responding variables, respec-
tively.
Assign Corresponds to a mov instruc-
tion in assembly
Load Dereference from V2 + Disp
and store it into V1
Store Store content of V2 into mem-
ory at V1 + Disp
Param Describes a parameter pass at
the call site (Addr) from ac-
tual V1 in the caller context to
a formal V2 in the callee con-
text
TranslateSPD Translates the spd value of the
parameters in the context of
the callee and vice versa. In
x86 first parameter has spd
value 4, second has 8 etc.
BinOp Describes a binary operation
where Op is applied on V1 and
V2 and the result is stored in
Res.
Constant Describes a constant value
used in a binary operation
Phi Corresponds to an SSA phi as-
signment. PhiReg is bound to
registers in the phi expression
Algorithm 1: Points-To Analysis. Fig. 3: Variables and EDB facts.
we utilize an Andersen-style algorithm [1] in Datalog which is flow- and field-
sensitive. Our algorithm is inspired by recent research done by Smaragdakis et
al. [40,41]. They show how context, flow, and field sensitivity can be achieved in
large-scale through a Datalog-based approach. We adapted their approach and
tailored our algorithms for binary analysis.
Each information about memory loads, stores, assignments, arithmetic op-
erations, control flow, and parameter passes which is expressed in terms of the
IL, is extracted into an extensional database (EDB). For each binary, an EDB
is produced which represents a knowledge base of a priori facts.
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A simplified version of our approach delivers the idea and is presented by
Algorithm 1. The Datalog algorithm is fed with the EDB which builds the base
for Datalog rules to derive new facts. These new facts build the intensional
database (IDB). The IDB and EBD form our knowledge base. In Figure 3, we
summarize the facts and variables used in Algorithm 1. Some rules are left-out
for the sake of brevity.
Datalog. To better understand what Algorithm 1 does, we refer the reader
to common literature on logic programming. Datalog is a declarative logic pro-
gramming language that has its roots in the database field [5] and its general
purpose is to serve as a query language for large, complex databases. Datalog
programs run in polynomial time and are guaranteed to terminate. Conventional
Datalog uses a Prolog-like notation, but with simpler semantics and without the
data structures that Prolog provides. Its approach to resolve new facts is close to
what dataflow algorithms do with arrangements of worklist algorithms. It strives
a set-oriented approach which we require, rather than a goal-oriented approach
as done in Prolog. A Datalog program consists of facts and rules which are rep-
resented as Horn clauses of the form: P0 : − P1, . . . , Pn, where Pi is a literal
of the form p(x1, . . . , xk) such that p is a predicate and the xj are terms. The
left-hand side of the clause is called head ; the right-hand side is called body. A
clause is true when each of its literals in the body are true.
Rules. Refer to Algorithm 1. The predicate VPtsTo stands for the points-to set
of a variable. Rule 2 specifies the following: Given an assignment from V2 to
V1 at a specific address, include the points-to set of V2 into that of V1. Rule 5
specifies a case of derived pointers: Given a binary operation such that Res = V1
+ V2, where V1 is a pointer, check if V2 is a constant. If the conditions hold, then
Res points to a stack location with a stack pointer delta of SPD+Value. Variable
Value is grounded by the third fact in the body of this rule. With rule 5 we
deduce a new points-to set that corresponds to a new stack location, which in
turn is again used to derive new points-to set information by the recursive chain
of rules. This procedure is performed on all rules until the process saturates,
i.e., a fixpoint is reached where we do not gain additional facts. Another rule
that deserves attention is rule 6 . Here points-to information is tracked into the
context of the callee. The rule specifies that if a stack pointer is passed as a
parameter, then a new points-to set is created for that parameter in the context
of the callee. If, for example, a stack pointer is passed as an argument, then
TranslateSPD in the body of the rule gives us its stack pointer delta value in the
context of the callee. A new points-to set is created for this argument which is
basically a new derived fact. This fact, in turn, falls into the recursive chain to
serve for deducing new facts. The procedure provides an on-demand approach
to track arguments of a function, only when they are passed by reference. We
achieve context-sensitivity by introducing tags at each call sites. These tags are
linked with the parameters.
To illustrate the approach, let’s assume that our analyzer runs over the fol-
lowing piece of code:
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foo: main:
0x8049000 mov eax , [esp +4] ...
0x8049004 mov dword [eax], 0xff 0x80490f0: lea ebx , [esp -0x30]
0x804900a mov [eax+4], eax 0x80490f4: push ebx
0x80490f5: call foo
At 0x80490f0-0x80490f4 a stack pointer is pushed onto the stack with a delta of
-0x30 which resides in [esp+4] in the context of foo. As the result of the prepro-
cessing step, we have Param and TranslateSPD facts extracted into our EDB (see
Figure 3). For this example, we have the facts Param([esp 17], 1, 0x80490f5,
"main", [esp+4], "foo"), and TranslateSPD(1, "foo", 4), where [esp 17]
corresponds to the location the stack pointer is pushed to at 0x80490f4. Since we
are dealing with a passed stack pointer, our analysis derives VptsTo([esp 17],
-0x30, 0x80490f4. "main"). By using rule 6 , the points-to analysis can now
deduce the fact VPtsTo([esp+4], 4, 0x8049000, "foo"). Note that the pointer
is now considered to have a delta of 4 in the new context. We do this to keep track
of pointers that are parameters, otherwise we lose focus on where the pointer
might originate from.
With rule 2 , we get the connection to eax, and with rule 3 , 4 the con-
nection of [eax+4] to the underlying memory object, i.e., a pointer to itself. By
Definition 1, we refer to [eax+4] as (4, 4) since the base points to a location with
delta 4 and we are accessing the location that is 4 bytes apart from the base.
3.3 Safe Zones
In this section we describe our approach to determine if a given stack read is
safe. With safe we refer to the property that a read is covered by its definitions
on all paths. Each basic block where a safe read occurs is considered a safe basic
block. Since we are dealing with different memory objects, the set of safe basic
blocks is different for each object/variable. More formally, we define it as follows.
Definition 2. Let CFG = (V,E) be the control flow graph, S the set of all stack
variables, and let Defs = {(spd, fld, bbs) | bbs ∈ V, (spd, fld) ∈ S} be the set of
all stack accesses that define the stack location (spd, fld) at bbs. bbs is called
a safe basic block. Each edge that originates from bbs is called a safe edge with
respect to (spd, fld). Each safe edge is a tuple of the form (spd, fld, bbs, bbt) with
(bbs, bbt) ∈ E. The set of all safe basic blocks with respect to (spd, fld) is called
the safe zone of (spd, fld).
Apparently, if all incoming edges to a basic block are safe edges with respect
to some variable (spd,fld) then that basic block is a safe basic blocks for that
variable. To determine safe zones of each variable we proceed as sketched in
Algorithm 2. An unsafe read occurs if a path exists that avoids the safe zone,
i.e., a path from the entry of the function to the use location which does not go
through safe edges. Lines 17−21 generalize this procedure for all stack accesses.
If such a path does not exist, we flag the basic block as safe.
In its essence the algorithm does a reaching definition analysis for each stack
variable and labels the basic blocks and edges accordingly. The initial process for
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building safe zones is achieved through lines 7 − 13. From each definition node
with respect to the specific stack variable, the information about its definition
is propagated further along its path in the control flow graph.
Each stack variable is associated with its own safe zone. Note that we do
not use memory SSA as it introduces conflicts and complicates the points-to
analysis. Hence, benefits of SSA in this manner are marginal.
1: Input: CFG = (V,E), Defs, Uses
2: DOM (dominator sets)
3: Outputs: SafeZone, E (SafeEdges)
4: Let E′ = SafeEdges = {}
5: Let SafeZone = Defs
6: Let Vars =
⋃
(spd,fld,bb)∈Defs∪ Uses
(spd, fld)
7: for each (spd, fld, bb) ∈ SafeZone do
8: E′ = E′ ∪ {(spd, fld, bb, bbx) | (bb, bbx) ∈ E}
9: for each bbd ∈ DOM(bb) do
10: E′ = E′ ∪ {(spd, fld, bbd, bbx) | (bbd, bbx) ∈ E}
11: SafeZone = SafeZone ∪ {(spd, fld, bbd)}
12: end for
13: end for
14: Let Unsafe = {}
15: for each (spd, fld, bb) ∈ Vars do
16: if ∃p =< bbstart, . . . , bbi, bbj , . . . , bb > with
17: (spd, fld, bbi, bbj) /∈ E′, ∀bbi, bbj ∈ p, i 6= j
18: then Unsafe = Unsafe ∪ {(spd, fld, bb)}
19: else SafeZone = SafeZone ∪ {(spd, fld, bb)}
20: end for
Algorithm 2: Sketch: Computation of Safe
Zones
Fig. 4: Graphical representation
of labeling safe edges.
Example 31. Figure 4 illustrates the labeling of safe edges. Basic blocks 2 and 3
define variables a and b, respectively. Each use of the variable in these basic blocks
is considered safe. Accordingly, each use of variable b in {3, 6} is considered safe.
At a stack pointer delta of −x an access to variable a is possible. Its field/offset
(fld a) is zero. For an access to variable b, fld b is added. Safe Zone with respect
to (−x, fld a) consists of basic basic blocks {2, 3, 4, 6, 5, 7}. For (−x, fld b) we
have {3, 6}. Each use of the variable in these basic blocks is considered safe.
3.4 Interprocedural Flow Analysis
During the data flow analysis, we propagate state information that concerns the
initialization of passed arguments between caller and callee. Information about
pointers is passed back and forth by the points-to analysis. We use this infor-
mation to determine indirect accesses (see rule 8 , 9 in Algorithm 1). If a leaf
node in the callee context is flagged safe with respect to a stack access, we flag
the corresponding call sites as safe. This procedure propagates information back
to the caller, extending the safe zone in the caller context. In turn, Algorithm 2
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needs another run by using the new information and distinguish between unsafe
and safe accesses to the stack. Previously unsafe accesses might turn to safe
accesses through this process. This procedure is repeated until it saturates, i.e.,
no changes to the set of safe basic blocks.
Summaries: A common technique used in interprocedural static analysis is the
use of summaries [37]. These summaries can be block summaries which gather
the effects of a basic block, or function summaries that gather the effects of the
whole function with respect to the variables of interest. Whenever a function call
is encountered, these summaries are utilized and applied. The facts in Datalogs
EDB and its deduced facts through rules in the IDB can be seen as such sum-
maries. Whenever a function call is encountered, the analysis uses facts about
the function that concern the variables of interest.
Multiple analyses plugins: As shown in Figure 1, our design has a plugin
mechanism. All plugins operate on the same knowledge base. Plugins deduce
and incorporate knowledge into the knowledge base which can transparently
be tapped by other plugins and library routines. This, for instance, allows the
Uninitialized Stack plugin to operate on information deduced by the Heap Allo-
cators plugin. Each plugin can be run in parallel and whenever new information
enter the knowledge base, the plugins adapt to it. Each change to the knowledge
base with respect to warnings and safe zones is monitored.
Detecting Uninitialized Accesses: When the analysis reaches its fixpoint,
all information about safe and unsafe zones with respect to all stack accesses is
present. A stack access outside its safe zone causes a warning. Additionally, we
track each use to its origin, i.e., in the case of a stack pointer, we track it to the
call site where the pointer originates from.
3.5 Symbolic Execution
For each warning, we need to check if a satisfiable path exists to the use of
the variable by avoiding its safe zone. We therefore need a mechanism for path-
sensitivity in our analysis process. To tackle path sensitivity, we utilize under-
constrained symbolic execution [32]. Under-constrained symbolic execution im-
mensely improves the scalability by checking each function directly, rather than
the whole program. Due to the lack of context before the call of the function
under analysis some register/memory values are unconstrained, hence the under-
constrained term.
For each variable that caused a warning, we feed the symbolic execution
engine with information about its safe zones. Satisfiability is checked from the
function entry to the flagged variable by avoiding the basic blocks in its safe zone.
We start at each origin, i.e., the function where the stack variable originates
from. To improve the scalability of the symbolic execution, we initially skip each
function call. If a path is satisfiable then we might have an overapproximation,
since some skipped function might have made a constraint become unsatisfiable.
For unsatisfiable paths, we look at the unsat-core, i.e. those constraints which
have caused the path become unsatisfiable. A function that alters one of these
variables in those constraints is then set free to be processed by the engine;
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again in a similar fashion by first skipping calls in the new function context until
we eventually reach a satisfiable state. The only difference is that we now force
the engine to run into basic blocks that modify the variables that made our
constraints become unsatisfiable. As a result, we basically overapproximate the
set of satisfiable paths. Filtered warnings are removed as such in the knowledge
base.
4 Implementation
Our prototype is implemented on top of the Amoco framework [44]. The decision
for Amoco is favored due to its flexible IL. It allows us to extend its set of
expressions. Each new expression transparently integrates and interplays with
the standard set of expressions.
We retrieve the control-flow graph from the disassembler IDA Pro which is
shown to be the most accurate [2]. Each basic block is transformed into an Amoco
basic block. We extended Amoco to support SSA and implemented the algorithm
proposed by Cytron et al. [15]. In particular, we adapted the concept of collectors
that are described in Van Emmerik’s work on decompilers [45]. Collectors can
be seen as an instrumentation of the SSA algorithm. The algorithm proposed by
Cytron et al. uses a stack of live definitions whenever a basic block is processed.
This information is valuable to put into a knowledge base. For instance, we can
instrument the algorithm to write a set of live definitions at call sites into our
knowledge base which we use to translate SSA subscripted expressions back and
forth between caller and callees. Due to SSA with respect to registers, we obtain
partial flow sensitivity.
We built the symbolic execution on top of angr [38], a platform agnostic
binary analysis framework. As Figure 1 indicates, we plan to attach more en-
gines to our framework. This is motivated by the fact that each engine comes
with advantages and its shortcomings, which we hope to compensate by com-
bining different engines. The points-to analysis results are saved into a separate
database. If extensions are needed, we can reuse this database and let Datalog
evaluate new facts based on the new extensions.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the prototype implementation of our analysis frame-
work and discuss empircal results. Note that the analysis framework is by design
OS independent. Our analyses were performed on a machine running with In-
tel Xeon CPUs E5-2667@2.90GHZ and 128GB RAM. The programs presented
in Table 1 and Table 2 are compiled for x86-64. Our prototype is not limited to
64 bit, but also supports 32 bit binaries.
5.1 CGC Test Corpus
As a first step to obtain a measurement on how our approach copes with realis-
tic, real-world scenarios, we evaluated our prototype over a set of Cyber Grand
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Table 1: Analysis results for the relevant CGC binaries that contain an unini-
tialized memory vulnerability.
Binary Functions Facts Pointer Facts Stack Accesses Unique Warnings
Hackman 70 46k 545 943 9
Accel 185 109k 2179 2057 33
TFTTP 58 30k 175 600 3
MCS 122 156k 860 2498 11
NOPE 105 57k 568 1378 8
Textsearch 90 50k 290 597 2
SSO 64 26k 204 650 4
BitBlaster 10 4k 42 95 1
Challenge (CGC) binaries which, in particular, contain a known uninitialized
stack vulnerability. These CGC binaries are built to imitate real-world exploit
scenarios and deliver enough complexity to stress out automated analysis frame-
works. Patches of the vulnerabilities ease the effort to find the states of true
positives and hence these binaries can serve as a ground truth for our evalua-
tion. We picked those binaries from the whole CGC corpus that are documented
to contain an uninitialized use of a stack variable as an exploit primitive and we
evaluate our prototype with these eight binaries.
Table 1 shows our results for this CGC test setup. The third column of the
table depicts the number of facts extracted from the binary building up the
EDB. The fourth column shows the number of deduced pointer facts. The fifth
column depicts the total number of stack accesses. The sixth column denotes the
number of potential uninitialized stack variables grouped by their stack pointer
delta value and their origin. This approach is similar to fuzzy stack hashing as
proposed by Molnar et al. [31] to group together instances of the same bug.
For each of the eight binaries, we successfully detected the vulnerability. Each
detected use of an uninitialized stack variable is registered, among which some
might stem from the same origin. Therefore, we group those warnings by the
stack pointer delta values of those stack variables from which they originate.
The individual columns of Table 1 depict this process in numbers. We double-
checked our results with the patched binaries to validate that our analysis process
does not produce erroneous warnings for patched cases. For each patched binary,
our analysis does not generate a warning for the vulnerabilities anymore.
5.2 Real-World Binaries
Beyond the synthetic CGC test cases, we also applied our analysis framework
on real-world binaries. Table 2 summarizes our results for binutils gnuplot, and
ImageMagick. The values in parentheses are manually verified bugs. Note that
the number of warnings pinpointing the root cause and the potential flaw through
an uninitialized variable is comparatively small to the number of all accesses.
Additionally, our symbolic execution filter was able to reduce the warning rate
by a factor of eight in our experiments. Despite the false positive rates which we
discuss in the next sections, we strongly believe that the output of our prototype
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Table 2: Analysis results for binutils-2.30, ImageMagick-6.0.8, gnuplot 5.2 patch-
level 4. Number in parentheses denotes the number of verified bugs.
Binary Functions Facts Pointer Facts Stack Accesses Unique Warnings
objdump 2.5k >4M >19k 23k 42 (2)
ar 2.4k >3.2M >16k 19k 24
as-new 2.2k >2.9M >9k 15k 29
gprof 2.3k >3.8M >16k 20k 34 (1)
cxxfilt 2.2k >3.1M >15k 18k 22
ld-new 2.8k >3.8M >16k 22k 15
strings 2.2k >3.5M >15k 19k 11
size 1.9k >3.1M >15k 19k 20
readelf 115 >107k >5k 543 4
gnuplot 3k >7.2M >12 23k 54 (2)
Image Magick 6.5k >24M >31k 150k 168 (2)
is a valuable asset for an analyst and the time spent to investigate is worth the
effort. The numbers are given in column 6 of Table 2. Overall, we found two
recently reported vulnerabilities in ImageMagick, two previously unknown bugs
in objdump, one unknown bug in gprof, and two bugs in gnuplot. A manual
analysis revealed that the bugs in objdump and gprof are not security critical.
The two bugs in gnuplot were fixed with the latest patchlevel at the time of
writing.
Our analysis can also cope with complex programs such as web browsers,
interpreters and even OS kernels in a platform-agnostic manner. We tested our
framework on MSHTML (Internet Explorer 8, CVE-2011-1346), Samba (CVE-
2015-0240), ntoskrnl.exe (Windows kernel, CVE-2016-0040), PHP (CVE-2016-
7480), and Chakra (Microsoft Edge, CVE-2016-0191). In each case, we success-
fully detected the vulnerability in accordance to the CVE case.
Error Handling Code: Our study on hundreds of warnings shows that many
warnings are internally handled by the programs itself through error handling
code. To address this problem, we implemented a plugin that checks—starting
from the corresponding call site—if a return value might go into a sanitization
process. We track the dataflow into a jump condition and measure the distance
to the leaf node. If it is smaller than a threshold value of 3, we assume that the
return value is sanitized and handled. This simple procedure works surprisingly
well in most cases to shift the focus away from paths that run into error handling
code.
5.3 Heap Allocations
User space programs use a variation of malloc for allocating memory dynami-
cally. Performance-critical applications like browsers even come with their own
custom memory allocators. To enable tracking of dynamic memory objects, we
use a list of known memory allocators and enriched the knowledge base with
pointer information. The points-to analysis grabs this information and deduces
new facts. As a consequence we can observe a coherence between stack locations
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and heap. While this is an experimental feature of our framework, it has proven
itself valuable by pinpointing three uninitialized bugs in gprof and objdump
which originate from the heap.
6 Discussion
The discovery of vulnerabilities for both the CGC binaries and real-world bina-
ries demonstrates that our approach can successfully detect and pinpoint various
kinds of uninitialized memory vulnerabilities. Our analysis is tailored to stack
variables, with a design that is well-aligned with the intended purpose of a bug-
detecting static analysis. However, it also comes with some limitations that are
not currently tackled by our prototype and we discuss potential drawbacks of
our approach in the following.
Heap: It is well known that analyzing the data flow on the heap is harder than
data flow on the stack and in registers. To address this problem, for example
Rinetzky and Sagiv proposed an approach to infer shape predicates for heap ob-
jects [36]. More recently, the topic of separation logic has garnered more attention
as a general purpose shape analysis tool [34]. This is—among other reasons—due
to the fact that aliasing analysis becomes much more difficult for real-world code
that makes use of the heap as compared to the data flow that arises from stack
usage. We account for all stack accesses under the reconstructed CFG. Hence,
a stack variable which is initialized through a heap variable is supported by our
approach. A points-to analysis needs to account for this interplay. Therefore, we
implemented a component that adapts to the given set of points-to facts and
tracks heap pointers originating from known heap allocators (see § 5.3). This
procedure is by design not sound, however the discovered bugs which originated
from the heap were found by using this approach.
Many performance-critical applications like browsers have their own custom
memory allocators which poses a problem to address. However, there is work on
this field with promising results as shown in recent research done by Chen et
al. [6, 8].
False Positives/False Negatives: Many analyzers come with a set of strate-
gies to deal with the number of warnings by, for instance, checking the feasibil-
ity of paths. Each strategy is usually tied to certain aspects of the problem, an
approach which we adapted and discussed in the last sections to tackle false pos-
itives. However, we are dealing with many undecidable problems here, i.e., the
perfect disassembly and the fact that detection of uninitialized variables itself is
undecidable in general.
Aggressive compiler optimizations can also pose a burden on the disassembly
process as they can facilitate the problem of unpredictable control flow. Even for
a state-of-the-art tool like IDA Pro, control-flow analysis is hampered by unpre-
dictability and indirect jumps. Points-to information can resolve some of these
indirect jumps [16]. However, its demand for context sensitivity is expensive for
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large applications. Programs that contain recursion further restrict the capa-
bilities of static analysis, as shown by Reps [33]. A combination with dynamic
approaches might prove itself valuable and information derived by them can be
incorporated into our knowledge base. Recall, that each change in the knowl-
edge base is adapted transparently, i.e., facts are removed, added and deduced
constantly by adding or removing information from it.
A valuable feature for any analyzer is the question of soundness. A fully
sound analysis is hard to achieve in practice due to code that we cannot analyze
(e.g., libraries which are not modeled or dynamically dispatched code where we
might loose sight). A sound analysis needs a perfect disassembly resulting in a
perfect CFG, which is an undecidable problem. Therefore, false negatives are
not avoidable. Similar source code based systems use the term soundiness [26]
as they can guarantee soundness for specific parts of the code under analysis
only [29].
We strongly believe that if an analyzer finds enough errors to repay the cost
of studying its output, then the analyzer will be a valuable and cost-effective
instrument in practice.
7 Related Work
The development of methods for static analysis spans a wide variety of tech-
niques. Modern compilers like the GNU-Compiler, MSVC, or Clang can report
uninitialized variables during compile time. They utilize the underlying compiler
framework to implement an intraprocedural analysis to detect potential unini-
tialized variables. As discussed earlier, compilers are trimmed to run fast, and
the analysis time for costly interprocedural algorithms is not desired. For opti-
mization purposes, the benefits of extensive interprocedural analyses might not
be desirable to apply [35].
Flake was one of the first to discuss attacks against overlapping data [18],
an attack vector closely related to our work on uninitialized memory reads. His
presentation focuses on finding paths that have overlapping stack frames with a
target (uninitialized) variable.
Wang et al. present case studies about undefined behavior [46] among which
are induced by the use of uninitialized variables. In a more recent work, Lee et al.
introduce several methods to address undefined behavior in the LLVM compiler
with a small performance overhead [25].
A popular attempt to tackle the problem of uninitialized memory reads is
binary hardening. StackArmor [7] represents a hardening technique that is
tailored to protect against stack-based vulnerabilities. To determine functions
that might be prone to uninitialized reads, static analysis is used to identify
stack locations which cannot proven to be safe. The system can protect against
uninitialized reads but cannot detect them. SafeInit [30] extended this idea
and represents a hardening technique specifically designed to mitigate uninitial-
ized read vulnerabilities. The authors approach the problem from source code:
based on Clang and LLVM, the general idea is to initialize all values on the
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allocations site of heaps and stacks. In order to keep the overhead low, several
strategies are applied to identify suitable spots. They modify the compiler to
insert their initialization procedures. By leveraging a multi-variant execution
approach, uninitialized reads can be detected. This, however, needs a corpus
of proper inputs that can trigger those spots. UniSan [27] represents a simi-
lar approach to protect operating system kernels. Based on LLVM, the authors
propose a compiler-based approach to eliminate information leaks caused by
uninitialized data that utilizes dataflow analysis to trace execution paths that
lead to possible leaking spots. UniSan checks for allocations to be fully initial-
ized when they leave the kernel space, and instruments the kernel in order to
initialize allocations with zeros, if the check is violated.
Another recent approach by Lu et al. [28] targets uninitialized reads in the
Linux kernel. They propose techniques for stack spraying to enforce an overlap
of the sprayed data with uninitialized memory. With a combination of symbolic
execution and fuzzing, they present a deterministic way to find execution paths
which prepare data that overlaps with data of a vulnerability.
Giuffrida et al. [19] present a monitoring infrastructure to detect different
kinds of vulnerabilities, among them uninitialized reads. They perform static
analysis at compile time to index program state invariants and identify typed
memory objects. The invariants represent safety constraints which are instru-
mented as metadata into the final binary. Their approach also allows to update
and manage metadata dynamically. The proposed framework monitors the ap-
plication in realtime and checks for invariant violations. Ye et al. propose a
static value-flow analysis [47]. They analyze the source and construct a value
flow graph which serves to deduce a measure of definedness for variables. The
analysis results are used to optimize the instrumentation process of binaries.
Other systems which instrument binaries either at compile or execution time
to detect uninitialized reads at runtime are proposed in the literature [3, 42].
These systems can be used in combination with a fuzzer or a test suite to detect
uninitialized variables. One advantage of these dynamic systems is that for each
detected uninitialized bug an input vector can be derived. On the other hand,
only executed paths will be detected and hence the code coverage is typically
low. In addition, an appropriate corpus of input data is needed. In contrast, our
static approach is capable of analyzing binary executables in a scalable way that
provides high code coverage.
In summary, the wealth of work in recent research, most of which rely on
source code, is tailored to instrumentation purposes to aid dynamic analysis
in a monitoring environment. In contrast, our approach follows a purely large-
scale static analysis that addresses the proactive detection of bugs in binary
executables.
8 Conclusion
Uninitialized memory reads in an application can be utilized by an attacker for a
variety of possibilities, the typical use case being an information leak that allows
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an attacker to subsequently bypass information hiding schemes. In this paper, we
proposed a novel static analysis approach to detect such vulnerabilities, with a
focus on uninitialized stack variables. The modularity of our framework enables
flexibility. We have built a prototype of the proposed approach that is capable of
doing large-scale analyses to detect uninitialized memory reads in both synthetic
examples as well as complex, real-world binaries. We believe that our system
delivers new impulses to other researchers.
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